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Chapter 8

Optimising Mine Action Policies and
Practice
Alan Bryden

Introduction1
Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) affect communities and
individuals long after conflicts end and therefore have a profound effect on
opportunities for post-conflict peacebuilding. In the immediate post-conflict
phase the presence, or simply the threat, of landmines can hamper refugee
return and the implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes. They
pose a long-term social, economic and environmental threat that denies the
use of fertile land and access to water and affects flows of people, goods and
services. There is also an important security risk from abandoned explosive
ordnance stockpiles or caches which, if not properly secured or destroyed
following the end of hostilities, offer rich pickings for insurgents, rebel
groups, criminals and other disaffected elements that mark the post-conflict
landscape. Mine action – ‘activities which aim to reduce the social,
economic and environmental impact of mines and UXO’2 – is therefore an
important aspect of post-conflict peacebuilding, both in its own right and as
an enabling activity for other elements of the peacebuilding agenda.
The governance of mine action involves a wide range of stakeholders
both at the strategic policy level and in the implementation of mine action
programmes on the ground. For a number of reasons that will be discussed
below, linkages and potential synergies between mine action and other postconflict peacebuilding activities have not been fully exploited. This chapter
will assess the complexities of governing mine action generally as well as
potential and actual linkages to other elements of post-conflict peacebuilding
by analysing two interrelated governance issues. First, the multi-actor, multilevel nature of mine action creates barriers between different stakeholders,
potential democratic deficits in decision-making processes and a knowledge
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gap between constituencies both at the strategic level and in the field. It will
be argued that stakeholders need to be brought closer together, coordination
mechanisms reassessed and fresh expertise tapped, if progress is to be
sustained and synergies with other peacebuilding activities fully realised.
Second, in post-conflict peacebuilding, the involvement of the international
community offers important opportunities, but also creates particular
challenges. A security governance perspective provides a means to better
link policy and practical mine action agendas with the wider security
governance challenges faced by states emerging from conflict. These
challenges relate, on the one hand, to coordination and cooperation between
different elements of the international community’s response. On the other,
they are embedded in the relationship between international actors and
domestic stakeholders, and in particular the common goal of building
capacity and instilling local ownership of post-conflict peacebuilding
activities.
The chapter begins by tracing the emergence of mine action on the
international humanitarian agenda and its evolution as a humanitarian
activity. It then considers the various mechanisms adopted by the
international community to address this challenge and analyses gaps in
current approaches from the perspective of security governance. Linkages
between mine action and other aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding are
assessed drawing on the cases of Afghanistan and Kosovo. The chapter
concludes with several policy recommendations drawn from this analysis.

The Evolution of Mine Action
Although a number of historical weapons can be linked to the modern
landmine, mass-produced landmines have only been in widespread use since
the 1939–45 war, with significant mine clearance activities having taken
place since 1945.3 However, mine action as a distinct humanitarian
discipline only really began in Afghanistan from 1988 with a UN-assisted
appeal for funds to assist ‘humanitarian demining.’4 The UN subsequently
supported the creation of a number of Afghan non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and facilitated their training in mine clearance
techniques, setting a precedent for the involvement of various UN bodies in
the coordination and implementation of mine action globally. The first of
many international NGOs operating in this field, the HALO Trust,5 was also
founded in the same year to work in Afghanistan. Mine action activities
subsequently expanded to many other countries,6 particularly in Asia, Africa
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and the Balkans, but also, though to a more limited extent, in Eastern Europe
and the Americas. The mine and UXO clearance operation which followed
the 1991 Gulf War was notable for the emergence of a number of
commercial demining companies who have since become significant actors
in mine action.
Mine action is distinguished by its underpinning humanitarian
objective to make land safe for civilians. This logic is closely linked to the
nature of recent armed conflicts – particularly intra-state – in the developing
world involving the use of landmines not only as a tactical means of combat
against the enemy, but also as a weapon of terror specifically targeted
against civilians. In the immediate post-conflict phase of mine action, risk
reduction is therefore the key priority, clearing those mines that pose the
most immediate threat to human life. These priorities later shift to a
‘developmental’ emphasis on reducing the threat in socio-economic terms
posed by the presence of mines and other UXO. Indeed, one of the biggest
shifts in thinking within mine action since its inception has been from early
emphasis on the extent of mine infestation as a starting point for priority
setting, to an assessment of humanitarian impact as the key factor in
prioritising tasks. This is reflected in the definition of ‘mine action’ in the
international mine action standards (IMAS) as comprising: (1) mine risk
education; (2) humanitarian demining; (3) victim assistance; (4) stockpile
destruction; and (5) advocacy.7
The five components of mine action span the range of security,
development and policy-related activities that are most prominent in
addressing the threat posed by landmines and UXO: mine risk education
refers to activities which seek to reduce the risk of injuries from mines and
UXO by raising awareness and promoting behavioural change; humanitarian
demining refers to activities which lead to the removal of mine and UXO
hazards (including mine and UXO survey, marking and clearance); victim
assistance refers to all aid, relief, comfort and support provided to those
whose lives have been blighted by the explosion of a mine or item of UXO;
stockpile destruction refers to the physical destructive procedure of the
national stockpile of anti-personnel mines; and advocacy refers to public
support, recommendation or positive publicity with the aim of removing, or
at least reducing, the threat from mines and UXO.
The use of landmines is regulated by two international treaty
frameworks: the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the
UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).8 The APMBC,
opened for signature in December 1997, lays down a complete ban on the
use, production, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines
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(APMs). Amended Protocol II (APII) to the CCW, which had previously
been agreed in 1996, largely only restricts landmines, especially antipersonnel mines, seeking to minimise their effects through regulating their
use while accepting the underlying legitimacy of the weapons. Protocol V to
the CCW, which was adopted in 2003 but which has not yet entered into
force, establishes measures to address wider categories of explosive
remnants of war beyond landmines. If the Ottawa process9 that led to the
adoption of the APMBC has been most prominent in mobilising public
opinion and effectively stigmatising APMs, the CCW framework is
important in applying international humanitarian law (IHL) to specific
weapons that pose a particular danger to the well-being of civilians or inflict
excessive harm on combatants. The consensus-based CCW framework also
engages States such as China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States,
who still consider APMs militarily useful and are therefore unlikely to
adhere to the APMBC in the near future.

Governing Mine Action
Considering mine action from a governance perspective involves an
understanding of the various levels of political authority – national, subnational and international – which shape mine action. On these different
levels, principles of ‘good governance’ – such as accountability,
transparency and democratic participation – are particularly relevant.10 As
illustrated in Table 8.1, mine action is governed at the strategic level by
various actors within the UN system, donor governments, international
organisations and NGOs. These actors are also central to the implementation
of mine action programmes alongside commercial companies and a range of
national actors in mine-affected countries.
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Table 8.1: Key Mine Action Governance Actors and Roles11
Actor

Responsibilities

International level
UNDPKO

UNMAS

UNDP

UNOPS
UNICEF
UNDDA
OCHA
UNHCR
OSAGI
OHCHR
World Bank
WFP/WHO/FAO
Donor states
ICRC
GICHD
ICBL
NGOs
Commercial
companies
Organisation of
American States
European Union

Department responsible for UNMAS; integrates mine action into
peacekeeping, USG for Peacekeeping chairs Inter-Agency
Coordination Group on Mine Action (IACG-MA)
Overall policy coordination within and beyond UN system; provides
mine action assistance in humanitarian emergencies; oversees
international mine action standards (IMAS); coordinates planning for
transfer to national authorities
Supports development of national and local mine action capacity,
promotes coordination between mine action and wider development
community at country level
Service provider in design/implementation of mine action programmes
Supports development and implementation of mine risk education
projects in cooperation with UN and other partners
Supports UNSG in relation to APMBC and CCW; promotes
dissemination of annual State reports under the treaties
Lead agency for information sharing on humanitarian impact of
landmines and resource mobilisation
Addresses special needs of refugees in mine action
Advances gender equality and empowerment of women in mine action
Advances human rights aspects of mine action
Resource mobilisation and agenda setting on landmines as an
impediment to development
Linkages between mine action and respective mandates in food, health
and agriculture
Funding/in-kind support for mine action
Promotes development and implementation of IHL, victim assistance
and mine risk education
Operational assistance in mine action, research, development of
IMAS, support for APMBC process
Monitoring and advocacy for APMBC, research and production of
Landmine Monitor
Various, local and international, involved in full range of mine action
activities
Various, local and international, involved in range of mine action
activities, but primarily clearance
Military to military training in clearance/stockpile destruction; some
other mine action activities
Funding largely through the European Commission, commitment to
research and development
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Table 8.1 continued: Key Mine Action Governance Actors and Roles
Actor

Responsibilities

State level
Government

Parliament
Judiciary
Military
Police
Border guards

Develop, articulate and implement mine action policies and
programmes in accountable, transparent and cost-effective manner.
Draft and implement necessary domestic legislation.
Ensure compliance with legal obligations, scrutiny of budgets,
projects etc.
Prosecution of offenders under national law
Mine clearance, stockpile destruction
Ensure respect for land ownership following clearance
Prevent weapons trafficking including landmines

Private actors
Local authorities
Communities
Red Cross & Red
Crescent Societies
Media
Civil Society

In some countries, engaged in selection of sites for clearance
Managing the risks from mines or UXO on a daily basis12
National and local level mine risk education and support for victim
assistance
Provide spotlight/pressure on government decision-making, focus
on issues such as corruption. Key mine risk education role.
Advocacy role, assistance to victims, mine risk education etc.

The Strategic Policy Framework
The UN has the predominant role in the coordination of mine action
globally. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), set up in
October 1997 as part of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO), serves as the focal point for mine action within the UN system.
This includes mine action assistance in humanitarian emergencies and
peacekeeping operations, ensuring coordination between UN Headquarters
and its field operations as well as partners outside the UN system. These
actors come together in an Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine
Action and in a Steering Committee on Mine Action which also includes the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines (ICBL), as well as various mine action NGOs.
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A 1997 report commissioned by the UN on The Development of
Indigenous Mine Action Capabilities13 was strongly critical of UN
management and strategy, notably regarding the speed of initiation of
programmes in war-torn environments. The study emphasised the need for a
mix of political, management and technical expertise as well as reform of
budgetary and administrative procedures. These criticisms of the UN role in
coordinating mine action can still be heard today and stem from the
organisation’s multiple commitments, including for policy, norms and
standards setting, implementation, and coordination. These problems are
clearly exacerbated by the multiplicity of actors involved within and outside
of the UN system.
Mine action has been funded by a relatively small number of donor
governments, notably Canada, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and
the United States. Much of this funding, estimated at $2.07 billion for the
period 1992–2003,14 has been prompted, directly or indirectly, by the
APMBC. Donors contribute to mine action either through the UN or
bilaterally through support for mine action NGOs or commercial companies,
as well as through the provision of equipment, personnel and training, and
investments in research and development. UNMAS coordinates the
Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for assistance in mine action which was
established in 1994 to provide resources for UN mine action where other
sources were not available. The VTF has proved an inefficient mechanism
for channelling money to programmes and is disliked by donors because of
the high overheads retained by the UN Administration and its slow
disbursement of funds to field operations. Increased use of bilateral and
other funding mechanisms have sought to bypass such bureaucratic
bottlenecks but have also posed problems for the UN’s mine action
coordination role. The key governance mechanisms which apply to different
levels of mine action are described in Table 8.2 below.
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Table 8.2: Key Mine Action Governance Mechanisms
Mechanism

Function

Multilateral
IACG-MA
Inter-Agency Coordination
Group on Mine Action

Integration and coordination of UN mine action

SCMA
Steering Committee on
Mine Action

Coordination between UN and other mine action actors

MASG
Mine Action Support Group

Monthly donor forum based in New York to discuss issues
of concern

Resource Mobilisation
Contact Group

Convened by states in margins of APMBC Standing
Committee to address treaty issues

Forum of Mine Affected
Countries

Cooperation mechanism for New York-based
representatives of mine affected countries

UN Programme Managers
meeting

Annual information exchange between UN field managers,
UNHQ and other stakeholders

APMBC
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention

Annual reporting requirements, annual meetings and fiveyearly review conferences, intersessional work programme
related to treaty implementation

CCW
Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons

Annual reporting requirements, review meetings on treaty
implementation

IMAS
International Mine Action
Standards

Guidelines for national governments, mine action centres
(MACs) and demining organisations as a basis for
standards, standard operating procedures

VTF
Voluntary Trust Fund

Provides resources for UN mine action where other funding
not available

ITEP
International Test and
Evaluation Programme

Facilitates cooperative testing of mine action equipment
and technologies
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Table 8.2 continued: Key Mine Action Governance Mechanisms
Regional/Subregional
ITF
International Trust Fund

Raises funds for mine action in South Eastern Europe

National
UNCT
United Nations Country
Team

Principal country level coordination mechanism composed
of representatives of UN agencies, led by senior UN
official in country

NMAA
National Mine Action
Authority

Government department(s), organisation(s) or
institutions(s) – often an interministerial body – in a mineaffected country charged with overall mine action
regulation, management, coordination

MAC
Mine Action Centre

Organisation or institution that carries out operational mine
action coordination; has primary responsibility for
information management; develops workplans with local
organisations/external agencies/NGOs /deminers

Sub-State
Deed of Commitment

Non-legally binding document used by NGO Geneva Call
to engage non-state actors to ban APMs and cooperate on
mine action

MAPU
Mine Action Planning Unit

Used in Cambodia to prioritise clearance tasks based on
requests from communes, villages, districts; issues
documents confirming land ownership

The Legal and Normative Framework
The origins of the campaign that led to the APMBC began entirely through
the efforts of civil society. The ICRC raised the problem of increasing
numbers of landmine amputees through diplomatic, legal and public
awareness efforts while the NGOs that came together to form the ICBL15
brought a range of field experience to the issue. The strength of the ICBL lay
in its structure, combining a small international staff which provided
direction and coordinated policy on behalf of hundreds of local organisations
around the world. These civil society efforts combined with the work of
sympathetic States to lay the ground for the successful negotiation of the
treaty. This coalition of States, international organisations, and NGOs was
particularly influential because of its cross-regional nature, undercutting
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traditional alliances and multilateral channels of communication.16 Price
notes that ‘the most basic effect of civil society, then, has been the
transnational dissemination of information about the scope of landmine use
and its effects, thereby helping to define the use of AP landmines as not only
a problem but as a global crisis’.17 The movement to ban anti-personnel
mines grew because a ban seemed the logical solution to an obvious
humanitarian disaster. As important as the inclusive nature of the Ottawa
process was its message. Ken Anderson, former Director of the Arms
Division at Human Rights Watch, notes that ‘this utter moral and political
clarity was an integral part of the campaign in reaching various publics’.18
The visibility of the mine ban issue was, therefore, essential to the success of
the pro-ban lobby.
The APMBC represents a unique modern example where a grassroots
campaign has combined with inter-State negotiations, outside of the UN
framework and without the critical involvement of major powers, to produce
an international arms control agreement.19 Certainly, widespread resistance
to US lobbying during the Ottawa negotiations, including by close allies
France and the United Kingdom, demonstrates the strength of the anti-APM
norm. There is also evidence that the process has had some influence on the
behaviour of States not party to the treaty: the US complies de facto with the
majority of the treaty’s requirements while Russia and China have ceased
APM exports.20 The APMBC is also significant in terms of norm spillover
with momentum from the anti-APM campaign providing new vigour to
advocacy efforts in related issues such as small arms and light weapons,
cluster bombs and explosive remnants of war.
The ICBL retains an influential role in the implementation of the
APMBC although concerns have been voiced over its structure and whether
the organisation has adapted to the qualitatively different demands of treaty
implementation. Anderson qualifies the frequently held association of the
Ottawa process with a ‘new diplomacy’21 or ‘new multilateralism’22 by
pointing out the ‘permanently incurable democratic deficit’ when NGOs
work directly with State actors, cautioning against the conflation of NGO
coalitions with civil society more broadly.23 Hubert also recognises, ‘the risk
that humanitarian advocates would seek second best solutions that are
palatable to progressive governments, particularly where NGO coalitions are
largely the product of government funding’.24 Annual meetings of States
Parties to the APMBC and an intersessional work programme have become
major fora to discuss implementation and interpretation of treaty obligations.
These intersessional meetings were reduced in frequency in 2005 following
a decision by States Parties at the first Review Conference of the APMBC
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and have been regarded in some quarters as more significant for awarenessraising among the diplomatic community than for bringing tangible benefits
to mine action in the field.
Article 7 of the APMBC requires annual reporting to the UN
Secretary General on a range of treaty issues. This transparency measure is
complemented by a significant annual ICBL publication, Landmine Monitor,
which reports on every State (whether or not they have adhered to the treaty)
as well as major contested territories. It has also allowed local researchers to
provide their input on mine-related issues. This comprehensive publication
records progress and highlights problems in the implementation of the treaty.
It represents a positive example of giving ‘teeth’ to a disarmament treaty in
the absence of formal, treaty-based verification mechanisms.
The APMBC has produced clear benefits in areas such as stockpile
destruction, in the eradication of the licit trade in APMs, and more broadly in
normative terms through effectively stigmatising the use of APMs. However,
some mine action practitioners feel that an undue emphasis on advocacy
distracts attention and resources from mine action in the field. A related
concern is that while ‘ownership’ of mine action is highly visible in policy
statements and international meetings, the true influence of the South in
policy formulation is, arguably, much more limited. Beier questions the
association commonly found in the literature which cites the Ottawa process
as a success of global civil society by distinguishing between ‘collapsed
political time’ as a result of the Ottawa process and ‘unchanged political
space’ in its impact on ownership of the process by mine-affected
countries.25 Although analysis of the ‘ownership’ of the Ottawa process
would require significant further analysis, the potential for the process to
become detached from reality in mine-affected countries and from actual
demining activities would be particularly unfortunate given that its strength
lay in engaging the expertise of mine action practitioners.
Mine Action Programming
Fundamentally, as enshrined in the APMBC and the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS) issued by the UN, States are responsible for
clearing mines within their own territory (even if they were not responsible
for their emplacement), typically under the auspices of an inter-ministerial
national mine action authority (NMAA). A Mine Action Centre (MAC) is
responsible for day-to-day coordination and implementation of mine action
policy and activities. However, States emerging from conflict commonly
lack the capacity to manage their mine action activities, or there may be a
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political vacuum in a country or region. In such cases, the UN may assume
this role. Local capacity building is a central goal in order to hand
responsibility for this activity back as soon as possible to the legitimate
national authorities.
Capacity building in mine action is understood as ‘a state’s ability and
willingness to develop and articulate mine action policy and direction. It is
also about a state’s ability to plan, coordinate, manage and sustain a mine
action programme that is accountable, cost-effective and able to address the
humanitarian and socio-economic implications of landmine contamination,
and to provide appropriate legislation’.26 Mine action programming, as with
other externally supported peacebuilding efforts, suffers from the
‘Samaritan’s Dilemma’. As Maslen notes, ‘the generosity of donors can
make it less likely that the recipients exert the necessary efforts to help
themselves’.27 This concern has been reflected in calls for a more critical
assessment of the actual rather than intended capacity building effects of
externally sponsored and implemented mine action activities.
One challenge to capacity building has been a preference by donors
for home-grown organisations and in-kind contributions – such as staff and
equipment – when these have not been the most appropriate solutions to a
given national or local mine action context. Similarly, the selection of MAC
staff has been criticised in a number of studies with the prevalence of
military and former military personnel proving a barrier to fostering the
developmental and capacity building aspects of mine action.28 As noted by
Kjellman et al, ‘such a professional composition is not necessarily inherently
problematic, but it does have the potential to limit the understanding of
broader humanitarian objectives within mine action, and brings with it an
approach in which authority and the possibility for sanctions may tend to
dominate’.29
Significant questions remain over the development of capacity to
govern mine activities by national authorities. Executive and legislative
bodies must be capable of assuming responsibility for setting policy,
overseeing and managing mine action at the national level. There is also an
emerging recognition that capacity building of mine action actors at the local
level can only be optimised within the framework of an effective national
mine action strategy.30 Security sector actors and institutions are key to
addressing these issues in practice. Overall planning and priorities need to be
agreed at national level and sequencing is essential: why clear schools if
there are no teachers? Security sector governance actors should also be much
more closely implicated in an aspect of mine action programming that
receives insufficient attention: corruption. Diversion of funds, self-interested
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selection of clearance tasks and ‘land-grabbing’ have long been associated
with certain demining programmes. Responsibility for this issue rests with
the range of civil management and oversight bodies at the national level as
well as judicial and public security bodies and civil society at national and
local levels (see Table 8.2). A recent study on the development of national
mine action legislation31 highlights a number of significant potential benefits
from the development of such legislation including improved coordination
within government and with international actors, improved accreditation
procedures as well as increased transparency and accountability. Failure to
address such concerns erodes donor confidence, undermines the goals of
mine action programmes and has particularly important consequences at the
national level in the face of public scrutiny.
There is a significant potential role for current and former military
forces in demining, stockpile destruction, and other aspects of mine action.
Coordination of military forces at the national level is particularly important.
Revising military doctrine, manuals and retraining troops are some measures
that may be required in regard to legal obligations under the APMBC.
Equally important is to acknowledge areas where military forces are weak,
notably in taking account of socio-economic criteria and implementing
community-based mine risk education.32 The link between DDR and
building mine action capacity, discussed below in the case of Kosovo, has
not been adequately explored in more general terms. Similarly the use of
military troops for demining as a post-conflict confidence-building measure
in local communities has been noted in cases such as Nicaragua and
Thailand, but broader lessons have not been developed.
State and civil society actors also have a very important role in land
allocation and protection of land rights as well as mine risk education and
victim assistance at the community level. There is a need to better link these
issues with other civil society roles in advocating for and assisting
communities. As Harpviken and Skara point out, ‘it is therefore important
that priorities are set in a legitimate and transparent manner in order to
reduce the potential for tension; this will ultimately also serve as a model for
good governance’.33 In this respect, armed non-state armed actors who
represent a major category of mine users today need to be more effectively
engaged.34 They often control mined territory and are responsible for the
manufacture, trade, selling and use of landmines. However, being
characterised by decentralisation, poverty and unwillingness to compromise,
they offer a qualitatively different challenge to State actors (see Chapter 3).
NGOs can play an important role in addressing armed non-state actors when
States are unwilling or unable to negotiate with such actors. The ICRC has a
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long history of such engagement while the NGO Geneva Call was
established in 2000 with the specific mandate of engaging such armed
groups in a ban on APMs and in the respect for humanitarian norms. It does
so through encouraging groups to adhere to Deeds of Commitment that
mirror the requirements the APMBC places on states.35
Mine action programming, therefore, must emphasise local ownership
and the building of genuine national capacity over the long-term. Addressing
the obstacles described above should dictate the timing of handovers to local
authorities. Kosovo is the only case to date where the UN has handed over
responsibility for mine action to local actors and, as discussed below,
subsequent developments in that province have not been unproblematic.
Mine Action in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding
Mine action reduces deaths and injuries and allows refugees and internally
displaced persons to return home in relative safety following the end of
hostilities. It is also an important enabling activity for rebuilding economies,
transport and other infrastructure as well as providing jobs (including for
former combatants). Consequently there is an obvious need for integration of
mine action with other post-conflict peacebuilding tasks geared to providing
a secure environment such as SALW measures, DDR, and broader efforts to
address disrupted social and economic networks.
Mine action’s impact on security in post-conflict peacebuilding is
demonstrated by over 37 million stockpiled APMs destroyed to date36 in
accordance with the requirements of the APMBC. The value of destroying
ordnance stockpiles following the end of hostilities is highlighted in the case
of Iraq where vast quantities of munitions were littered throughout the
country in both rural and urban settings following the fall of the Saddam
regime, posing a threat to both coalition security and local communities.
Indeed, such ordnance was used in the bomb attack on UN Headquarters in
Baghdad on 10 August 2003 which caused the deaths of 22 UN staff,
including UN Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello.37 The priority given to
this issue is shown in the award of contracts by the US, valued at more than
$478 million in 2003 alone, to begin disposal of Iraqi ordnance.38
The willingness of former parties to a conflict to reveal the location of
minefields, destroy stockpiles or agree to clearance in territory under their
control is not just a disarmament activity but an evident confidence-building
measure. It is also important to note that the stigmatisation of APMs in
particular is felt on the ground (as well as by the international community).
This is an important distinction from small arms, which are frequently
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regarded as legitimate (see Chapter 7), and contributes to the widespread
perception of demining as an ‘honourable’ profession.
In a number of cases, the decision to include mine action in peace
agreements has resulted in important benefits.39 The obligation on former
parties to a conflict to provide information on mine-laying can be one
important output. Equally important is the willingness indicated by such an
agreement of the new national authorities to commit to mine action. The
1992 Mozambique peace agreement made no reference to mine action and
the lack of agreement on such activities by former warring parties meant that
a UN programme was initiated with no clear planning for the handover of
responsibilities to national authorities, resulting in years of misguided and
inefficient mine action efforts.
However, Harpviken and Skara conclude from a review of donor
policy statements that ‘the link between mine action and peacebuilding is
generally acknowledged, but poorly developed’.40 Applying the logic of
peacebuilding to mine action can have limited or counter-intuitive results if
not done carefully. In Mozambique, road clearance was prioritised as an
immediate support to the UN peacebuilding mission in that country.
Contracts worth hundreds of thousands of dollars were given out to clear
2,000 kilometres of roads which, after months of operations, uncovered only
six mines.41 More critically, Harpviken and Roberts describe how the
demining and reopening of Highway A9 in Sri Lanka enabled internally
displaced persons to return home to settlements that had not themselves been
cleared, leading to casualties among returnees.42 There is also a seemingly
logical link between building mine action capacity and DDR with
demobilised soldiers offering a ready pool of recruits already familiar with
handling weapons and accustomed to following orders and set procedures.
However, the cases of Afghanistan and Kosovo below give contrasting
messages as to the potential benefits of such linkages.
These examples reflect the vulnerability of external actors to
unfamiliar and complex local contexts. While mine action capacity building
can provide a model for re-establishing good governance the inverse is also
true. The influx of foreign investment can cause tensions and attract the
corrupt and self-interested.
In summary, mine action is one of the earliest entry points for the
international community in states emerging from conflict. If conducted well,
it can offer significant security benefits through its disarmament and
confidence building effects which are not only positive in their own right but
serve as enabling activities for related peacebuilding tasks. Moreover, if the
national capacity-building dimension of mine action is developed, important
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emulation effects for other areas of security governance can be accrued.
However these ‘ideal’ goals often founder in complex post-conflict
environments. The following section addresses such challenges based on
mine action experiences in Afghanistan and Kosovo.

Lessons from Afghanistan and Kosovo
This section considers mine action, in particular the governance of mine
action, in the specific post-conflict peacebuilding contexts of Afghanistan
and Kosovo. While not seeking to directly compare two very different cases,
both have received significant investments from the international community
and in terms of mine action are held to be models for successful
programmes, with responsibility for mine action in Kosovo handed back to
local actors in 2001 and a similar handover planned in Afghanistan by the
end of 2005.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan is one of the most heavily mined countries in the world. Soviet
forces entered the country in December 1979 in support of an Afghan
government which had seized power in an April 1978 coup d’état. Conflict
between Soviet-backed government forces and Mujahedeen rebel forces
grew in scale with the rebels increasingly supported by the West. The 1989
withdrawal of Soviet forces was the precursor to the collapse in 1992 of the
‘communist’ regime. A period of fighting among rebel groups was followed
in 1994 by the emergence of the Taliban as a political and military force.
Within the next two years the Taliban gained control of most of the country,
including Kabul. Linkages between the Taliban government and Al-Qaida
were the catalyst, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, for
the US-led military intervention which overthrew the Taliban to be replaced
by the government of Hamid Karzai.
In 1988, after unsuccessful military-driven efforts to train Afghan
deminers, the UN supported the creation of a number of specialist Afghan
NGOs operating under international supervision from neighbouring
Pakistan. Although the plan was met with concern by the international
community – in particular over the need to give training in explosives to
former guerrilla fighters – it was the only viable option on the table and
formed the basis for today’s Mine Action Programme in Afghanistan
(MAPA). The programme includes national and regional offices as well as
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oversight responsibility for 15 Afghan NGOs. Regime change in
Afghanistan made available unprecedented levels of funding for mine action
as part of the wider reconstruction process, opening up previously
inaccessible areas of the country for clearance. This opportunity immediately
presented the problem that little information was available on the extent of
mine or UXO infestation that would permit priority-setting.
A recurrent problem in Afghanistan is that despite the high overall
level of funding the delivery of funds by the UN-administered VTF has been
erratic, with arrears in payments to Afghan NGOs resulting in operating
problems and potential gaps in operational and equipment standards.43 A
specific consequence of the broader peacebuilding context in Afghanistan is
that demining organisations have been losing staff to the UN as well as other
agencies and contractors offering higher salary scales.
The ongoing military action has posed problems for mine action
operations. Initially, sub-munitions were deployed which are particularly
difficult to make safe and had the same distinctive colour as UN air-dropped
food parcels.44 Moreover, according to one MACA employee, a lack of
coordination between the UN-controlled International Security Assistance
Force and demining organisations has led to a number of incidents including
the killing of four deminers by security guards.45
One specific initiative, Mine Action for Peace (MAFP), has tried to
link mine action with the reintegration of soldiers in their own communities,
setting mine action efforts alongside the broader goals of transforming
relationships between former combatants and facilitating reintegration. The
initiative is integrated in the MACA but is also part of the broader DDR
effort in Afghanistan – the Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP).
The goal of MAFP is to give former combatants, selected in conjunction
with local councils, a package of mine action and vocational training, a
reintegration grant and thirteen months guaranteed employment. However,
in a review of the programme, Strand notes two sets of challenges that
affected its implementation:46
x Contextual challenges included factional disputes, weak central
government, unrealistically high donor expectations and competition
from opium farming;
x Specific problems stemming from the overall management role of the
ANBP. Symptomatic was a decision to withhold a payment to hand in
weapons, on the basis that former commanders would seek to obtain
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them, seriously undermined confidence in the programme as well as
the broader DDR programme from participants.
Strand suggests that the inexperience of national staff members and
international staff with a predominantly military mindset and limited
knowledge of the Afghan context contributed to ‘the relative inflexibility of
the organisation and for the emphasis on the technical, as opposed to the
larger political and social, aspects of the programme’.47 Despite these
problems, the programme has proved effective in disrupting commandercombatant relationships, supporting community reintegration and reconciling
former combatants from opposing factions. It is notable that the DDR
dimension was greatly facilitated by being grafted on to an already mature
and respected activity in mine action.
The historical strength of the Afghan mine action programme, coupled
with unprecedented levels of donor support, provide a firm basis for
continued progress in clearing the country of mines and UXO. A recent
Needs Assessment suggests that, dependent on a sustained commitment,
Afghanistan could be free of the ‘impact’ of mines within five to seven
years.48 The critical challenge for mine action (as for reconstruction and
development more broadly) is one of capacity building and ownership. There
is a danger that responsibility for mine action is handed back to Afghan
ownership before its institutions are ready to assume the demands of policy
and management required by this role. It is also important to recognise that
while national capacity may be deficient, capacity-building at the regional
level in the NGOs that conduct mine action is the major success story of
mine action in Afghanistan. Consequently, there is a related danger that the
historical neutrality of the Afghan NGOs involved in this work, which has
proved constant through over a decade of operations, is jeopardised. As
Maslen notes, given that the security situation in Afghanistan remains
dangerous and humanitarian organisations are not immune to being targeted,
‘many NGOs are therefore sensitive to any change in the programme that
gives it more of a government identity’.49 Weak government capacity,
ongoing military operations and the only very recent development an
adequate legal framework within which mine action is situated therefore
suggest that the transition of ownership should not be rushed in Afghanistan.
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Kosovo
Kosovo’s mine and UXO problem does not have a long historical legacy but
came about as a result of fighting between the ethnic Albanian Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) and Serb forces which broke out in 1998 following
years of tension during conflict in the wider Balkan region. Failed
negotiations driven by the international community were followed by NATO
airstrikes against Serbian military targets which added unexploded submunitions to the barrier and nuisance minefields laid by the opposing
forces.50 The 11-week bombing campaign was ultimately successful,
resulting in a ceasefire agreement on 3 June 1999.
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 provides the governing
framework in Kosovo under which NATO-led Kosovo Stabilisation Force
(KFOR) troops are mandated to provide a stable and secure environment in
coordination with the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK),
established on 10 June 1999. Immediately following the end of hostilities,
ethnic Albanian refugees and internally displaced persons flooded the
heavily mine and UXO-affected region seeking to return home. UNMIK,
through UNMAS, established a Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC)
as early as 17 June 1999, mandated to manage and coordinate all mine action
within Kosovo with the support of KFOR, the humanitarian community and
international donors.
MACC Programme Manager John Flanagan notes that ‘the MACC
was deliberately set up as a “coordination centre”, rather than the more
traditional mine action centre,’51 allowing other organisations to focus on
their core competences. The availability and management of information
was key to this role and a dedicated tool, the Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which is now used in more than 80
percent of mine action programmes,52 was first deployed in Kosovo.
Information made available on Serb and KLA mine-laying53 was
complemented, following institutional bottlenecks and problems of security
classification, by details of NATO bombing missions. Similar delays were
encountered in the provision of information by KFOR on demining
conducted in support of KFOR operations.
The plethora of bilaterally-funded NGOs and commercial
organisations working on aspects of mine action in the province provided a
major coordination challenge for the MACC. Some of these organisations
had limited practical experience and a lack of standing operating procedures
which undoubtedly led to duplication of effort and increased cost. These
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bilateral arrangements also meant that the MACC’s coordination role was
based on goodwill rather than authority.
Personnel and equipment needs of the newly established MACC were
largely met by donations from various governments with in-kind
outnumbering regular staff by a ratio of nearly two to one. In many cases
these staff had no experience in mine action, which led to a credibility gap
given the coordination role of the MACC.54 Funding proved an ongoing
concern for the programme with significant donor funding channelled
bilaterally. This factor was highlighted in the UN-commissioned review of
the Kosovo mine action operation: ‘in any peacebuilding operation, mine
action should not be a discretionary activity left to the charitable impulses of
the donor community’.55As an example, the UNMIK budget for 1999–2000,
was not made available to the programme until late 2000.56
Kosovo’s status as an international protectorate has implications for
all post-conflict peacebuilding activities in the province. Political authority
remains largely with UNMIK although specific responsibilities have been
gradually transferred to local provisional institutions. Mine action was
labelled from a very early stage as an activity suitable to be handed over to
local authorities. In this respect a key UNMIK decision was that
responsibility for mine clearance be given to the Kosovo Protection Corps
(KPC), an organisation made up of demobilised ethnic Albanian fighters and
very closely identified with the KLA. This was deemed by UNMIK to be an
effective way to demilitarise and reintegrate former combatants but had a
number of unforeseen results. First, the decision reduced options for building
civilian mine action capacity by depriving inhabitants of the province who
had already been trained of long-term employment prospects. Second, initial
training of the KPC was not ‘fit to task’ resulting in poor work. Third, major
concerns were raised about the political and ethnic bias of the force,
particularly if deployed in ethnic Serb enclaves. This final point was
reflected in a lack of support by KFOR, particularly concerned by the
prospect of giving the KPC explosives, which led to significant delays in
implementing the policy.
Responsibility for mine action was handed to newly founded
government authorities on 15 December 2001, despite a residual landmine
and UXO threat. Concerns were voiced that this was a political exit strategy
by UNMIK that came too early for the nascent executive. This is borne out
by the fact that senior management posts are still held by international staff
and a lack of capacity in the relevant Ministries is apparent. As a
consequence, authority for mine action in early 2004 moved back to
responsibility of UN Special Representative, reflecting a need for greater
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control and oversight. On the operational level, although recent
improvements have been noted, the KPC has proved inefficient and certain
clearance tasks have been assumed by their international trainers, the NGO
Handicap International. In six districts declared free of mines and UXO,
contamination has subsequently been found, leading to new surveys and
clearance as well as to significant embarrassment for the UN and donors.57
The threat posed by mines and UXO in Kosovo has been significantly
reduced since 1999 but the mine action faces the same governance questions
relating to capacity and ownership vis à vis the role of the international
community that need to be addressed in the province.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
This chapter has sought to delineate the governance of mine action at the
levels of strategic policy and programming. As demonstrated by the cases of
Afghanistan and Kosovo, the governance of mine action is further
complicated in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding as the constellation
of actors and their interactions increase. It is argued that applying a security
governance perspective provides a useful way of deconstructing the policy
process and its relation to mine action programming. Moreover, it enables a
better understanding of the linkages and potential synergies between mine
action and other aspects of the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda. On this
basis the following recommendations are proposed:
x Legal and normative frameworks for mine action at the international
level could further contribute to effectiveness at national and subnational levels. The APMBC and CCW work programmes provide a
mechanism for the oversight of mine action that has not been fully
exploited to date. Greater transparency and critical analysis on how
resources are used – both by mine action programmes and mine
affected states – would result in significant benefits on the ground if
backed up by sufficient political will.
x Better coordination of mine action is a precondition for better
integration with the broader post-conflict peacebuilding agenda.
Short-term or slowly disbursed funding and the provision of
inappropriate in-kind contributions continues to hamper the effective
implementation of mine action programmes. Bureaucratic knots need
to be untied and programmes provided with ‘fit to task’ tools and
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adequate funding if they are to succeed in already difficult
environments. Moreover, if the UN’s coordination role is to be
successful, bilateral donors and other mine action funders must ensure
that this role is enshrined in agreements with mine action NGOs and
commercial companies and that they apply the same standards in their
work.
x Effective mine action as peacebuilding requires all elements of the
international community’s response to pull together. There is a
significant potential for mine action to make a more explicit
contribution to post-conflict peacebuilding. This requires greater
coordination between transitional administrations, peacekeeping
forces, mine action stakeholders and other relevant actors. In
particular, it is essential that decisions are not based on ‘political’
criteria but on a realistic appreciation of the local context. This entails
embracing expertise from related security and development fields,
notably NGO experts who in many cases are closer to what is
happening on the ground. Enlarging the knowledge base, in terms of
research, policy and programming, will enable new insights to be
developed and allow the international community to better situate
mine action with other development priorities.
x The provision of accurate and timely information is indispensable to
mine action. Accurate information is arguably the most important and
source difficult to obtain commodity in complex post-conflict
situations. Knowledge of the local context is essential for all
peacebuilding activities in order to avoid sub-optimal results as a
result of ‘imported’ approaches. The provision of relevant
information, including on mine use, should be enshrined wherever
possible in peace agreements between former warring parties.
Information of use to mine action organisations such as military mine
clearance activities and bomb damage assessment reports is often
available but compartmentalised and difficult to access. This should
be supplied as a matter of course and included in appropriate rules and
guidelines. The effective use of liaison officers between, for example,
the mine action coordination body in country and other agencies, is
one way to address such gaps.
x Building sustainable local capacity in states emerging from conflict is
the most difficult but most important objective in both mine action and
peacebuilding more broadly. The paucity of concrete examples where
ownership of mine action has been successfully handed back to
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national authorities is testament to the difficulty of building
sustainable capacity. A focus on governance structures and
mechanisms will facilitate sustainability: at the national level,
capacity-building for mine action needs to be closely linked to broader
efforts to encourage transparency, accountability and democratic
oversight in the area of security governance including the legislative,
executive and judiciary as well as security sector actors such as the
police, army and border management agencies. Capacity-building
opportunities should pay particular attention to the role of civil
society, in particular at local and regional. Finally, local ownership
involves leaps of faith in engaging actors with often difficult conflict
histories. This requires ongoing assessment and a willingness to
impose sanctions if evidence of misuse is apparent.
The process that led to the APMBC has achieved unprecedented results in
normative and practical terms while also invigorating advocacy on other
related humanitarian issues. Mine action has also adapted and developed
over a relatively short time period, particularly through greater appreciation
of the socio-economic dimensions of the issue. However, its particular
evolution points to the need for the better integration of mine action with
other security and development issues. As this chapter has sought to
highlight, more effective coordination and cooperation at headquarters and
on the ground, coupled with a determination to build local capacity in
difficult circumstances, will reinforce the significant efforts of all those who
work in this key area of post-conflict peacebuilding.

Notes
1

2
3

4

The author would like to thank Stuart Maslen for his insightful comments on earlier
versions of this Chapter. Responsibility for any errors in the text lies entirely with the
author.
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10, second edition (1 January 2003),
Standard 3.124, available at URL <www.mineactionstandards.org>.
For example, in the years following World War II, the area of Poland subject to
mine/UXO clearance was 271,840 square kilometers, or 87% of Polish territory. By 1985,
more than 88 million items of UXO, including 15 million mines had been disposed of.
Landmine Monitor (2004), p. 910.
This section on the genesis of mine action draws on ‘A Guide to Mine Action’ produced
by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), pp. 21-27,
available at URL <www.gichd.ch/about_gichd/guide/index.cfm>.

182

5
6
7
8

9
10

11

12

13

14
15

16
17
18

19
20
21

Alan Bryden

Hazardous Area Life-Support Organisation.
The 2004 edition of the Landmine Monitor identifies 83 mine affected countries around
the world. The report is available at URL <www.icbl.org/lm>.
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10 , op. cit.
Full titles: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction; and, 1980 United Nations Convention
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.
Named after the Canadian capital where the initiative was launched in October 1996 by
the then Foreign Minister of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy.
For a comprehensive analysis of the interrelated concepts of ‘governance’, ‘security
governance’ and ‘security sector governance’ see Hänggi, H., ‘Making Sense of Security
Sector Governance’, Hänggi, H., Winkler, T. (eds.), Challenges of Security Sector
Governance (Lit: Münster, 2003). An electronic version of this book can be found at URL
<www.dcaf.ch/publications/e-publications/Sec_Gov/contents.html>.
Information on the responsibilities of the various UN bodies has been drawn from Mine
Action and Effective Coordination : The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy, endorsed by
the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action (6 June 2005). Available at URL
<www.mineaction.org>.
Communities have to live with the threat and they do so more or less effectively,
depending on a variety of factors. Many set up what are, in effect, their own informal,
small-scale mine action programmes. For instance, when outside help is too slow to come
(in the eyes of the community) they may engage in so-called village demining – unofficial
and unregulated clearance of mines and UXO, often without any detection or protective
equipment. Mine action continues to grapple with this problem in a number of countries,
most notably across South-East Asia.
United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs, The Development of Indigenous
Mine Action Capabilities (DHA: New York, 1997). Available at URL
<www.reliefweb.int.>.
See URL <www.icbl.org/lm/2004/funding>.
The founding members of the ICBL were Handicap International; Human Rights Watch;
Medico Internationale; Mines Advisory Group; Physicians for Human Rights and the
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation.
Tomlin, B., Cameron, M., Lawson, B. (eds.) To Walk Without Fear: The Global
Movement to Ban Landmines (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1998), p.5.
Price, R., ‘Reversing the Gunsights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Landmines’,
International Organization vol. 52, no. 3 (1998), pp. 613-644.
Anderson, K., ‘The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International
Non-Governmental Organisations and the Idea of International Civil Society’, European
Journal of International Law vol. 11, no.1 (2002).
Lachowski, Z., ‘The Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines’, Armaments, Disarmament and
International Security, SIPRI Yearbook (1998), p.558.
Hubert, D., ‘The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy’,
Humanitarianism and War Project, occasional paper no. 42 (2000), p.29.
See for example: Davenport, D., ‘The New Diplomacy’, Policy Review (2002).

Optimising Mine Action Policies and Practice

183

22 Axeworthy, L., ‘Towards a New Multilateralism’, Cameron, M. A., et al, op. cit., pp. 448459.
23 Anderson, K., op. cit.
24 Hubert, D., op. cit., p. 70.
25 Beier, J. M. '‘‘Emailed applications are preferred’: ethical practices in mine action and the
idea of global civil society’, Harpviken, K.B. (ed.), The Future of Humanitarian Mine
Action (Palgrave: New York, 2004), p.28.
26 United Nations General Assembly, Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United
Nations Policy, UN Doc. A/53/496 (UNMAS: New York, 1998).
27 Maslen, S., Mine Action After Diana: Progress in the Struggle Against Landmines (Pluto
Press: London, 2004), p. 103.
28 For example see: Horwood, C., ‘Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a New
Sector in Humanitarian Aid’, Relief and Rehabilitation Network Papers, no. 32 (ODI:
London, 2000).
29 Kjellman, K. E., Harpviken, K. B., Millard, A. S., Strand, A., ‘Acting as One? Coordinating Responses to the Landmine Problem’, Happviken, K. B. (ed.), op. cit., p.86.
30 GICHD, A Study of Local Organisations in Mine Action (2004), pp.13-14. Available at
URL <www.gichd.ch/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Local_Organisations.pdf>.
31 GICHD, A Study of the Development of National Mine Action Legislation (2004).
Available at URL <www.gichd.ch/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Legislation_study.pdf.>.
32 GICHD, The Role of the Military in Mine Action. Available (2003). Available at URL
<www.gichd.ch/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Role_Military_MA.pdf.>.
33 Harpviken, K. B., Skara, B. A., ‘Humanitarian Mine Action and Peacebuilding: Exploring
the Relationship’, Harpviken, K. B. (ed.), op. cit., p. 39.
34 The 2004 Landmine Monitor describes mine use by non-state armed groups since May
2003 in Bhutan, Bolivia, Burma/Myanmar, Burundi, Colombia, DRC, Georgia, India,
Iraq, Nepal, Peru, Philipinnes, Russia (Chechnya and North Ossetia), Somalia, Turkey
and Uganda.
35 According to the Geneva Call website 27 armed groups in Burma, Burundi, India, Iraq,
the Philipinnes, Somalia and Sudan have agreed to ban the use of APMs through this
mechanism. A template Deed and complementary information can be found at: URL
<www.genevacall.org>.
36 Landmine Monitor, op. cit., p. 13.
37 Maslen, S., op. cit., p. 19.
38 Landmine Monitor, op. cit., p. 997.
39 See United Nations, ‘Mine Action Guidelines for Ceasefire and Peace Agreements’,
(United Nations Inter Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action: New York, 2003).
Available at URL <www.mineaction.org>.
40 Harpviken, K.B., Skara, B. A., op. cit., p. 37.
41 Maslen, S., op. cit., p. 34.
42 Harpviken, K.B., Roberts, R. (eds.), Preparing the Ground for Peace – Mine Action in
Support of Peacebuilding (PRIO: Oslo, 2004), p. 58.
43 Maslen, S., op. cit., p. 40.
44 Idem, p. 18.
45 Fruchet, P., ‘After the Taliban: Opportunities and Challenges in Mine Action in
Afghanistan 2002-2003’, Journal of Mine Action no. 8.1 (June 2004).

184

Alan Bryden

46 Strand, A., ‘Transforming Local Relationships: Reintegration of Combatants Through
Mine Action in Afghanistan’, Harpviken, K.B., Roberts, R. (eds.), op. cit., pp. 44-45.
47 Idem, p. 52.
48 Needs Assessment re-printed in GICHD, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
49 Maslen, S., op. cit.. p. 95.
50 Landmine Monitor 2004, op. cit., pp. 1208-1209.
51 John Flanagan quoted in Scott, J. J., ‘The Kosovo MACC : The Most Successful Mine
Action Program Ever’, Journal of Mine Action issue 6.1. Available at URL
<www.jmu.edu/journal/6.1/focus/scott/scott.htm>.
52 URL <www.gichd.ch/35.0.html>.
53 Mines laid by Yugoslav army (VJ) units were typically recorded whereas those deployed
by Serbian paramilitary forces were frequently targeted at civilians and went unrecorded.
KLA laid mines were also predominantly unmarked and unmapped.
54 The Praxis Group Ltd., Willing to Listen: An Evaluation of the United Nations Mine
Action Programme in Kosovo 1999-2001 (February 2002), p. 9.
55 Idem, p. 20.
56 Idem, p. 8.
57 Maslen, S., op. cit., p. 93.

